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Revolution, Culture and Collective Action
F. ROSE
The University of Texas at Austin

GREGORY

It is possible to argue, as Theda Skocpol did in her retrospective
analysis of the Iranian revolution, that the Islamic revolution in Iran
represents a fundamentally new type of revolution, a type which, precisely
because of its novel introduction of "the possible role of idea systems and
cultural understandings in the shaping of political action,'' 1 escapes
hitherto-developed
analytical categories. Such a view, however, is
misleading. It is misleading precisely because the novelty in the Iranian case
is not typological.
The novelty in the Iranian case is the degree to which this revolution
highlights the relationship between culture and collective action. The Iranian case merely exhibits in a more striking and unmistakeable fashion a
dynamic which is common to all revolutions, but which structural analysis
of the causes of revolution obscures because of assumptions such analysts
tend to make concerning a particular kind of collective action - revolutionary mobilization. Specifically, structural analysis of the causes of
revolutions assumes that economic outcomes associated with structural
causes are the necessary and, usually, sufficient conditions for revolutionary mobilization. In the Iranian case strictly economic incentives, while
present, were clearly of tertiary importance. 2 The fact that economic outcomes were not generally the source of revolutionary mobilization in Iran
does not suggest that Iran's revolution is a new type; rather it suggests that
the problem of revolutionary mobilization is a serious collective action
problem and that the econornic-determinist assumptions carried in structural analyses simply ignore the collective action problem by postulation of
strictly economic incentives for revolutionary mobilization.
What the case of Iran does provide is additional insight into the ways in
which collective action problems can be addressed. It raises the question of
whether culture - broadly defined - can condition an environment in
which the problem of revolutionary mobilization as collective action can be
rendered less intractable. The problem, to be sure, with culture as a variable
is that culture, by definition varies little over long periods of time. In the
case of Iran, however, one can see the impact of the cultural variable by
observing the relationship between changes of residency patterns of certain
"culture-bearers" and their amenability to revolutionary mobilization.
The general framework used for this analysis is that developed by
Samuel Popkin in his study of the Vietnamese revolution. 3 Popkin argues
that shifting the focus of analysis from aggregates to individuals permits
greater insight into the ways in which revolutionary movements mobilize a
mass base for seizing state power. Key to this shift of analysis is consideration of the problem posed by Mancur Olson in his general study of collective action, the problem of the free rider. Two assumptions characterize ac-·
tors where the free rider problem emerges - rationality (the actor discerns
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open alternatives and is capable of rank-ordering alternative courses of action in terms of maximizing some preferred utility) and egoism (the actor
most prefers that utility which most realizes his self-interest).' Two assumptions also characterize collective goods susceptible to the free rider problem
- the impossibility of excluding noncontributors and the jointness of the
goods' supply. In b,rief, the rational actor will choose that course of action
which imposes no costs upon himself if the collective action of others produces a good from which he cannot be excluded, regardless of his noncontribution - the problem which Olson identifies becomes the fact that:
... unless there is coercion or some other special device
to make individuals act in their common interest, rational, self-interested individuals will not act to achieve
their common or group interest.'
Olson suggests that the use of such special devices which produce excludable
goods for individuals can induce willingness on the part of rational-egoist
actors to engage in collective action . This view is termed the "by-product"
theory of collective goods. Popkin expands on Olson's original analysis by
suggesting that:
Contributions can occur (1) because persons contribute
for reasons of ethics, conscience, or altruism;
(2) because it pays to contribute on a pure cost-benefit
basis; (3) because of selective incentives (excludable
benefits), which can be either positive or negative; or
(4) because it pays to contribute, given that the contributions of others are contingent on one's own contribution. 6
In analyzing the Vietnamese revolution, Popkin suggests that peasants,
as rational-egoist actors, evaluate risks of participation in revolutionary
movements in terms of the ability of these movements to provide selective
incentives, the degree to which the leadership of such movements is credible, and the degree to which individual p!.!,rticipationis a condition of contribution by others.
The role of the political entrepreneur, as Popkin terms the revolutionary leadership, is pivotal. The mobilizing success of the political entrepreneur is conditioned by the degree to which he communicates in terms
and symbols which his target audience understands, he presents a credible
vision of the future, he embodies a persuasive moral code (frequently involving self-abnegation), he is familiar as a figure of authority to the target
audience, and he can provide "local goods and goods with immediate
payoffs" to convince the target audience of his efficacy. 1
In applying Popkin's framework to the Iranian case, I shall concentrate on revolutionary events in Tehran in the period August 1978 to
February 1979.' The vast majority of Tehran's urban poor, concentrated
primarily in the southern half of the city, consisted of either first- or secondgeneration peasant migrants to the city who frequently maintained close
social and economic links to the peasant communities from which they
emigrated.' Thus, if Popkin 's analysis of the constraints on peasant
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behavior imposed by village life is correct, one might expect Iran's recentlyurbanized peasants to exhibit approximations of the behavior Popkin
predicts. While the anthropological literature on recently-urbanized
peasants in Iran is sparse, what literature exists suggests striking parallels to
Popkin's model of peasant behavior; even more striking is the parallel between anthropological studies of peasant behavior in villages in Iran and
Popkin's observations in Vietnam. Furthermore, survey-research studies of
peasant motivations for emigration to urban centers in Iran strongly suggests that threat to subsistence was less a motivation than anticipation of a
higher standard of living available even to unskilled day-laborers in urban
centers. 10 Thus, recently-urbanized peasants in Iran exhibited no great riskaversion, but precisely the rational risk calculation which Popkin predicts.
The question which acutely arises is: why did these recently-urbanized
peasants become mobilized as the vast majority of active participants in the
revolutionary movement? What special incentives might have induced this
collective action and, more specifically, what special incentives might have
induced collective action of the particular type which occurred in Tehran?
This second question is significant in light of the gross disparity in recentlyurbanized peasant participation in revolutionary demonstrations organized
by the left and the National Front and those organized by the religious opposition; a call from the left or the National Front might produce a
demonstration of fifty thousand to two-hundred and fifty thousand persons; a call from Imam Khomeini put two to four million fnto the streets.
I suggest that recently-urbanized peasants chose to accept the leadership of Imam Khomeini and the religious opposition because that revolutionary leadership possessed more credible political entrepreneurs and provided a strong special incentive, the by-product of which was collective
revolutionary action.
Analyzing the religious opposition's leadership, and that of Imam
Khomeini in particular, a compelling case can be made for this proposition.
Anthropological and political observers have frequently commented on
Khomeini's use of terms, symbols and a speaking style which communicated more effectively with the peasant audience than any other· figure
in the opposition (Khomeini's radio-broadcast speeches are delivered with a
strong rural-accent and grammatical constructions which are more common
to the language of the lower social classes, and the peasant in particular,
than upper-class "literary" Persian). A content analysis of the speeches of
Khomeini and other religious opposition leaders in the pre-revolutionary
period indicates a high correlation between the semantic fields employed by
these leaders and their recently-urbanized peasant audience. The vision of
the future presented by Imam Khomeini, portrayed as it was in traditional
and religious imagery, was more credible than any non-religious, particularly Western, vision, the substance of which was, at best, incomprehensible to
the recently-urbanized peasant and, at worst, deeply offensive. Similarly,
Imam Khomeini in particular embodied a demanding moral code, the
substance of which was shared by the recently-urbanized peasant audience,
and Imam Khomeini's ascetic image stood in stark contrast to much of the
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imperial elite and competing revolutionary leaderships (this contention can
be called into question with respect to other figures in the leadership of the
religious opposition - however, Imam Khomeini, by and large, symbolized
the religious leadership for the target audience). Furthermore, the religious
leadership was, indeed, familiar to the recently-urbanized peasant as a
source of authority (the seniormost religious leaders, including Imam Khomeini, were known as the maraji'-i taqlid- "sources of emulation" - and
every believer, to the extent that he is not himself an expert in Islamic
jurisprudence, is obligated in Shi'i Islam to emulate such a source in matters
of religious practice, an institution known as marja'iyyat).
The fifth characteristic of effective political entrepreneurship - provision of local goods and goods with immediate payoffs - is less evident in
the Iranian case (and this is to an extent a consequence of the fact that the
Vietnamese case from which Popkin derived his model involved prolonged
guerrilla warfare, while the Iranian case was of far shorter duration and was
a largely urban affair). However, it can be plausibly argued that the provision of social welfare, through sadaqat (charity) and khoms (a kind of unofficial religious tax administered by the maraji'-i taqlicf) distributed by the
local mosques, after the collapse of the unskilled construction labor market
in Tehran in 1975-76 constituted such a local good with an immediate
payoff, particularly in light of the absence of a state-organized welfare
system. Still, this local good was certainly far less in scope and impact than
the local goods provided by Vietnamese revolutionaries.
The special incentive provided by the religious opposition was, simply
put, salvation. As Popkin himself notes, " . .. the quintessential excludables
often involve religion." 12 In the case of Shi'i Islam, the strong identification
of salvific faith with action to embody that faith, suggested by the
jurisprudential definition of iman (faith) as tasdiq (realization of God's will
on earth), conditioned salvation on behavior which aimed at realizing God's
intended polity on earth. 11 This was reinforced, no doubt, by the traditional
institution of marja'iyyat. Once the attention of the recently-urbanized
peasant was drawn by the religious leadership to the claimed entailment of
revolutionary action by the basic tenets of the faith, revolutionary mobilization rapidly occurred.
To be sure, Imam Khomeini had made such a call in 1963 and, while
the imperial regime was sorely tested by the ensuing clashes, no successful
revolutionary mobilization took place. I suggest that the difference in
1978-79 was in the concentration of the target audience in urban centers
which took place in the period 1964-1978 and which permitted considerably
more effective communication between the leadership of the religious opposition and the target audience. Table I shows the distribution of population in Iran's ten largest cities in 1966 and 1976. Tehran's population alone
increased by nearly 400Join that ten year period. 14 Table 2 indicates that
rural-to-urban migration throughout Iran accounted for 35.2% of the urban population increase in the same period, with an average annual increase
of 211,000 during the period attributed to rural-to-urban migration. A peasant population, thus, was concentrated from the relative diffused environ28

ment of Iran's 60,000 villages to a few urban centers, of which the most prominent was Tehran . In these centers, these urbanized peasants increasingly
turned to their cultural tradition, in particular Shi'i Islam, in response to the
anomie they experienced in the urban environment.'' This concentration in
urban centers of a population culturally-conditioned to religious appeals,
coupled with the increasing stature of Imam Khomeini as a religious leader
(Popkin's fourth criterion of political entrepreneurship) as he became
almost exclusively identified as the source of religious opposition to the imperial regime, provided the key difference between 1963 and 1978-79.
Application of Popkin's framework to the Iranian case highlights,
then the interesting way in which the Iranian revolution resolved the collective ;ction problem presented to it and sets the basis for a rather more interesting theoretical point.
TABLE I
Population Distribution in Iran's Ten Largest Cities:
1966-1976

1966

Ci ly

Tehran

1976

2,719,730
424,045
409,616
403,413
269,865
206,375
272,962
187,930
134,292
143,557

Isfahan
Mashhad
Tabriz

hiraz
Ahvaz
Abadan
Kcrmanshah
Qom
Rash,

4,496,159
671,825
670, 180

598,516
416,408
329,006
296,0 I
290,861
246,831
187,203

Sour« : Adapted from Kazemi, Po,.·erty and Revoluflon ,n Iran, p. 17.

TABLE 2
lncru e In Iranian Urban Populallon: 1966-76

Avtrage Annual

(000 )

Percentor
Total
lncrtase

2,621

43.7

262

2,111

35.2

211

Total
Populallon

Increase
(000)

Natural Population

Increase
Rural to Urban

M1gra1ion

Source: Adapted from Kucmi, Poverty and Revotunon ,n Iran, p 14.

Similar to the "free rider" problem of collective action is the problem
of the "Prisoners' Dilemma." Here it is shown that under certain conditions rational-egoist actors will be unable to reach a Pareto-optimal solution
to their dilemma, despite the convergence of their interests. The following
matrix illustrates the problem (where R is the reward, P is the punishment,
T is the utility accruing to defection, and S is the "sucker" payoff):
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B's Choice
Payoff Ordering:

Prisoner A's Choice:
COOPERATE
R,R (3,3)
T,S (4,1)

COOPE RATE
DEFECT

DEFECT
S,T (1,4)
P ,P (2.2)

Condition: R > (S + T)/ 2

T>R>P>S

In this game, both prisoners would be worse off by defecting than by
cooperating, but each ranks the utility accruing to defection higher in his
own self-interest than the utility of cooperation. When one adds, however,
certain additional assumptions, this outcome is no longer so clear. For example, if one assumes that both prisoners are members of Casa Nostro,
sworn to the oath of silence - omerta - and aware that defection would
likely result in the defector's murder at the hands of other organization
members, the subjective game matrix for the prisoners would be:

Prisoner B:

Prisoner A:
COO PERATE
R,R (4,4)
T,S (2,3)

COOPE RATE
DEFECT

DEFECT
S,T (3,2)
P ,P (l,l )

Thus, introduction of an assumption about prior relations of power, expectation, values and conventions can radically change the expected outcome
by predisposing the players to cooperation. Such outcomes have been
generally noted with respect to repeated-iteration games. As Alexander
Field suggests, rational-choice analysis has precisely to make assumptions
about such factors which affect how interests are determined and, consequently, how calculations about interests are made. 16
This excursus into the "Prisoners' Dilemma" highlights the general
theoretical contribution of the Iranian case. If the problem of revolutionary
mobilization is a free rider problem, then the intractability of such a free
rider problem is conditioned by the ways in which prior factors affect determination of interests by actors and the ways in which actors make calculations about their interests. This complex of prior factors is the "web of
significance" which Clifford Geertz has defined as "culture:" "a context,
something within which [social events] can be intelligibly described ."' 7 At
least four of Popkin's criteria of effective political entrepreneurship (communicative skill, shared vision, persuasive moral codes, and familiarity of
authority) point to the effect of culture on overcoming the problem of collective action. Furthermore, it is reasonable to suppose that cultures
wherein which special incentives are plentiful or a certain special incentive is
especially prized or a particular culture-bearing population is especially
available to political entrepreneurs provide environments wherein the problem of collective action can be more easily surmounted. This certainly seems
to be the case for Iran.
This analysis brings us full circle to the observation that structural
analyses of the causes of revolution fail to explain the Iranian case because
of their economic -determinist assumptions about collective action. The Ira30

nian case, certainly, does not suggest that extra-economic phenomena lie at
the root of all revolutionary mobilization; rather, it underscores the importance of the problem of collective action and, while economic special incentives may be present in some cases, the cultural environment can, and in the
case of Iran does, provide equally compelling special incentives. The question becomes, then, an empirical one.

31

Notes
'T heda Skopol, "The Rentier State and Shi'a Islam in the Iranian Revolution," Theory
and Society, 11, 268.
' I have no desire to debate whether the ultimate basis of all political, or even cultural,
phenomena is economic. I grant that it is possible to argue that economic causes ultimately
underlie all the event discussed herein. The point being made here is whether exclusively
economic causes immediately underlie all cases of revolutionary mobilization . Clearly, I do not
think that to be the case.
'Samuel Popkin, The Rational Peasant: The Political Economy of Rural Society in Vietnam (Berkeley, California: University of California Press, 1979). I do not argue that Popkin's
framework exhaustively explains the Iranian case, nor that the two cases - Iran and Vietnam
- share more than a handful of pertinent similarities. Rather, I argue that this handful of
similarities is powerful circumstantial evidence that culture can condition an environment such
that the problem of collective action is more easily overcome.
'Certainly egoism is not a necessary condition for rational choice analysis (whether an actor's utility preferences are self-interested or self-disinterested is irrelevant). However, Olson
clearly makes the assumption of egoism . See Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action:
Public Goods and the Theory of Groups (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University
Press, 1971), p. 2.
' Ibid. p. 5.
' Popkin, The Rational Peasant, p. 254.
' Ibid . pp . 259-262.
'I recognize the shortcoming of analyses which have focused on Tehran, often to the exclusion of equally important provincial centers of revolutionary activity. However, I suggest
that strong demographic similarities among the urban poor in Tehran and other major cities
compensates for any skewing of my analysis insofar as the social composition of this stratum in
most Iranian cities is remarkably homogeneous.
'Farhad Kazemi, Poverty and Revolution in Iran: The Migrant Poor, Urban Marginality
and Politics (New York: New York University Press, 1980).
"Mihdi Salam it, et. al., llal-i Muhajirat va Barrisi'y-i A wza-i Farhang-i, Igifsadi, va
Ijtima'i-yi Muhajirin-i Mantagih-yi Ya~hchiabad {Tehran: College of Social Work, 1971).
''See Gregory Rose, "Velayat-e Fagih and the Recovery of Islamic Identity in the Thought
of Ayatollah Khomeini," in Nikki Keddie, ed., Religion and Politics in Iran: Shi'ism from
Quietism to Revolution (New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press, 1983), pp. 166-188.
" Popkin , The Rational Peasant, p. 255.
"Wilfred Cantwell Smith, "Faith as Tasdiq," in Parviz Moreuedge, ed ., Islamic
Philosophical Theology (Albany, New York : State University of New York Press, 1979).
"Iranian census-takers systematically excluded potential respondents without permanent
addresses and have been accused of underestimating the urban poor population of Tehran by
as much as 50%.
" In March 1979 I was afforded the opportunity by the Government of the Islamic
Republic of Iran to examine confidential reports of the imperial regime's National Security and
Intelligence Organization (SA VAK) which repeatedly emphasized the growth of religious consciousness and observance among Tehran's urban poor in the period 1975-1978.
"Alexander J . Field, "The Problem with Neoclassical Insititutional Economics : A Critique with Special Reference to North / Thomas Model of pre-1500 Europe, Explorations in
Economic History, Volume 18, No. 2, 174-198.
" Clifford Geertz, The Interpretation of Cultures (New York: Basic Books, 1973), p . 14.
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